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Abstract
We consider a class of Nash games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a networked
system. In an aggregative game, a player’s objective is a function of the aggregate of all the play-
ers’ decisions. Every player maintains an estimate of this aggregate, and the players exchange
this information with their local neighbors over a connected network. We study distributed syn-
chronous and asynchronous algorithms for information exchange and equilibrium computation
over such a network. Under standard conditions, we establish the almost-sure convergence of
the obtained sequences to the equilibrium point. We also consider extensions of our schemes
to aggregative games where the players’ objectives are coupled through a more general form of
aggregate function. Finally, we present numerical results that demonstrate the performance of
the proposed schemes.
1 Introduction
An aggregative game is a non-cooperative Nash game in which each player’s payoff depends on
its action and an aggregate function of the actions taken by all players [37, 16, 17, 28].1 Nash-
Cournot games represent an important instance of such games; here, firms make quantity bids
that fetch a price based on aggregate quantity sold, implying that the payoff of any player is a
function of the aggregate sales [8, 14]. The ubiquity of such games has grown immensely in the
last two decades and examples emerge in the form of supply function games [17], common agency
games [17], and power and rate control in communication networks [2, 3, 4, 62] (see [1] for more
examples). Our work is motivated by the development of distributed algorithms on a range of
game-theoretic problems in wired and wireline communication networks where such an aggregate
function captures the link-specific congestion [3, 4] or the signal-to-noise ratio [40, 39, 56]. In
almost all of the algorithmic research on equilibrium computation, it is assumed that the aggregate
of player decisions is observable to all players, allowing every player to evaluate its payoff function
without any prior communication.
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1Such games have been shown to be closely related with subclasses of potential games [51, 9] where a potential
game refers to a Nash game in which the payoff functions admit a potential function [31]. The potential function of
an aggregative game is a special case of the function employed in [29], where distributed algorithms for optimization
problems with general separable convex functions are presented.
In this paper, we consider aggregative games wherein the players (referred to as agents) compete
over a network. Distributed computation of equilibria in such games is complicated by two crucial
challenges. First, the connectivity graphs of the underlying network may evolve over time. Second,
agents do not have ready access to aggregate decisions, implying that agents cannot compute
their payoffs (or their gradients). Consequently, distributed gradient-based [3, 40, 22, 23] or best-
response schemes [52] cannot be directly implemented since agents do not have immediate access to
the aggregate. Accordingly, we propose two distributed agreement-based algorithms that overcome
this difficulty by allowing agents to build estimates of the aggregate by communicating with their
local neighbors and consequently compute an equilibrium of aggregative games. Of these, the first
is a synchronous algorithm where all agents update simultaneously, while the second, a gossip-based
algorithm, allows for asynchronous computation:
(a) Synchronous distributed algorithm: At each epoch, every agent performs a “learning step”
to update its estimate of the aggregate using the information obtained through the time-
varying states of its neighbors. All agents exchange information and subsequently update
their decisions simultaneously via a gradient-based update. This algorithm builds on the
ideas of the method developed in [47] for distributed optimization problems.
(b) Asynchronous distributed algorithm: In contrast, the asynchronous algorithm uses a gossip-
based protocol for information exchange. In the gossip-based scheme, a single pair of randomly
selected neighboring agents exchange their information and update their estimates of both the
aggregate and their individual decisions. This algorithm combines our synchronous method
in (a) with the gossip technique proposed in [7] for the agreement (consensus) problem.
We investigate the convergence behavior of both algorithms under a diminishing stepsize rule, and
provide error bounds under a constant steplength regime. Additionally, the results are supported
with numerics derived from application of the proposed schemes on a class of networked Nash-
Cournot games. The novelty of this work lies in our examination of distributed (neighbor-based)
algorithms for computation of a Nash equilibrium point for aggregative Nash games, while the
majority of preceding efforts on such algorithms have been spent towards solving feasibility and
optimization problems. Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. While the proposed game-theoretic
problem can be easily solved via a range of centralized schemes (see [11] for a comprehensive survey),
any such approach relies on the centralized availability of all information, a characteristic that does
not hold in the present setting. Instead, our interest is not merely in equilibrium computation but in
the development of stylized distributed protocols, implementable on networks, and complicated by
informational restrictions, local communication access, and a possibly evolving network structure.
Broadly speaking, the present work can be situated in the larger domain of distributed compu-
tation of equilibria in networked Nash games. First proposed by Nash in 1950 [32], this equilibrium
concept has found application in modeling strategic interactions in oligopolistic problem settings
drawn from economics, engineering, and the applied sciences [14, 12, 4]. More recently, game-
theoretic models have assumed relevance in the control of a large collection of coupled nonlinear
systems, instances of which arise in production planning [15], synchronization of coupled oscilla-
tors [60], amongst others. In particular, agents in such settings have conflicting objectives and
the centralized control problem is challenging. By allowing agents to compete, the equilibrium
behavior may be analyzed exactly or approximately (in large population regimes), allowing for the
derivation of distributed control laws. In fact, game-theoretic approaches have been effectively
utilized in obtaining distributed control laws in complex engineered systems [49, 50]. Motivated
by the ubiquity of game-theoretic models, arising either naturally or in an engineered form, the
distributed computation of equilibria has immense importance.
While equilibrium computation is a well-studied topic [13], our interest lies in networked regimes
where agents can only access or observe the decisions of their neighbors. In such contexts, our inter-
est lies in developing distributed gradient-based schemes. While any such algorithmic development
is well motivated by protocol design in networked multi-agent systems, best-response schemes,
rather than gradient-based methods, are natural choices when players are viewed as fully ratio-
nal. However, gradient-response schemes assume relevance for several reasons. First, increasingly
game-theoretic approaches are being employed for developing distributed control protocols where
the choice of schemes lies with the designer (cf. [25, 27]). Given the relatively low complexity
of gradient updates, such avenues are attractive for control systems design. Second, when play-
ers rule out strategies that are characterized by high computational complexity [41] (referred to
as a “bounded-rationality” setting2), gradient-based approaches become relevant and have been
employed extensively in the context of communication networks [2, 3, 62, 40, 56].
The present work assumes a strict monotonicity property on the mapping corresponding to
the associated variational problem. This assumption is weaker than that imposed by related stud-
ies on communication networks [2, 3] where strong monotonicity properties are imposed. From a
methodological standpoint, we believe that this work represents but a first step. By combining
a regularization technique, this requirement can be weakened [22] while extensions to stochastic
regimes can also be incorporated by examining regularized counterparts of stochastic approxima-
tion [23]. However, all of these approaches are under the assumption that agents have access to the
decisions of all their competitors.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the distributed algorithms presented in this paper draw
inspiration from the seminal work in [57], where a distributed method for optimization has been
developed by allowing agents to communicate locally with their neighbors over a time-varying com-
munication network. This idea has attracted a lot of attention recently in an effort to extend
the algorithm of [57] to more general and broader range of problems [35, 46, 45, 19, 18, 36, 54,
33, 26, 58, 48, 59, 5]. Much of the aforementioned work focuses on optimizing the sum of local
objective function [35, 46, 45, 36, 54, 33, 26] in a multi-agent networks, while a subset of recent
work considered the min-max optimization problem [55, 6], where the objective is to minimize the
maximum cost incurred by any agent in the network. Notably, extensions of consensus based algo-
rithms have also been studied in the domain of distributed regression [48], estimation and inference
tasks [58, 59]. While much of the aforementioned work focuses on consensus-based algorithms, an
alternative distributed messaging protocol for consensus propagation across a network is presented
in [30]. The work in this paper extends the realm of consensus based algorithms (and not consensus
propagation) to capture competitive aspect of multi-agent networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the problem of
interest, provide two motivating examples and state our assumptions. A synchronous distributed al-
gorithm is proposed in section 3 and convergence theory is provided. An asynchronous gossip-based
variant of this algorithm is described in section 4 and is supported by convergence theory and error
analysis. In section 5.2, we present an extension to the problem presented in section 2 and suitably
adapt the distributed synchronous and asynchronous algorithm to address this generalization. We
present some numerical results in section 6 and, finally, conclude in section 7.
2This notion is rooted in the influential work by Simon [53] where it is suggested that, when reasoning and
computation are costly, agents may not invest in these resources for marginal benefits.
Throughout this paper, we view vectors as columns. We write xT to denote the transpose of a
vector x, and xT y to denote the inner product of vectors x and y. We use ‖x‖ =
√
xTx to denote
the Euclidean norm of a vector x. We use ΠK to denote the Euclidean projection operator on a
set K, i.e. ΠK(x) , argminz∈K ‖x − z‖. The expectation of a random variable Y is denoted by
E[Y ] and a.s. denotes almost surely. A matrix W is row-stochastic if Wij ≥ 0 for all i, j, and∑
j Wij = 1. A matrix W is doubly stochastic if both W and W
T are row stochastic.
2 Problem Formulation and Background
In this section we introduce an aggregative game of our interest and provide its sufficient equilibrium
conditions. The players in this game are assumed to have local interactions with each other over
time, where these interactions are modeled by time-varying connectivity graphs. We also discuss
some auxiliary results for the players’ connectivity graphs and present our distributed algorithm
for equilibrium computation.
2.1 Formulation and Examples
Consider a set of N players (or agents) indexed by 1, . . . , N, and let N = {1, . . . , N}. The ith
player is characterized by a strategy set Ki ⊆ Rn and a payoff function fi(xi, x¯), which depends
on player i decision xi and the aggregate x¯ =
∑N
i=1 xi of all player decisions. Furthermore, x¯−i
denotes the aggregate of all players excepting player i, i.e.,
x¯−i =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj.
To formalize the game, let K¯ denote the Minkowski sum of the sets Ki, defined as follows:
K¯ ,
N∑
i=1
Ki. (1)
In a generic aggregative game, given x¯−i, player i faces the following parametrized optimization
problem:
minimize fi(xi, x¯) , fi(xi, xi + x¯−i)
subject to xi ∈ Ki, (2)
where Ki ⊆ Rn and x¯ is the aggregate of the agent’s decisions xi, i.e.,
x¯ :=
N∑
j=1
xj = xi + x¯−i, x¯ ∈ K¯, (3)
with K¯ ⊆ Rn as given in (1), and fi : Ki × K¯ → R. The set Ki and the function fi are assumed to
be known by agent i only. Next, we motivate our work by providing an example of an aggregative
game, whose broad range emphasizes the potential scope of our work.
Figure 1: An information connectivity graph for a network with 6 firms.
Example 1 (Nash-Cournot game over a network). A classical example of an aggregative game
is a Nash-Cournot played over a network [8, 38, 22]. Suppose a set of N firms compete over L
locations. In this situation, the communication network of our interest is formed by the players
which are viewed as the nodes in the network. One such instance of connectivity graph is as shown
in Figure 1. This graph determines how the firms communicate their production decision over L
locations. More specifically, the firm in the center of the graph has access to information from all the
other firms, whereas all the other firms have access to the information of the firm in the center only.
We consider other instances of connectivity graph in Section 6. To this end, let firm i’s production
and sales at location l be denoted by gil and sil, respectively, while its cost of production at location
l is denoted by cil(gil). Consequently, goods sold by firm i at location l fetch a revenue pl(s¯l)sil
where pl(s¯l) denotes the sales price at location l and s¯l =
∑N
i=1 sil represents the aggregate sales
at location l. Finally, firm i’s production at location l is capacitated by capil and its optimization
problem is given by the following3:
minimize
L∑
l=1
(cil(gil)− pl(s¯l)sil)
subject to
L∑
l=1
gil≥
L∑
l=1
sil,
gil, sil ≥ 0, gil ≤ capil, l = 1, . . . ,L. (4)
In effect, firm i’s payoff function is parametrized by nodal aggregate sales, thus rendering an ag-
gregative game. Note that, in this example we have two independent networks, the first being used
to model the communication of the firms and the second being used to model the physical layout of
the firms production unit and locations. We allow the communication network to be dynamic but
the layout network is assumed to be static.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions and Assumptions
To articulate sufficiency conditions, we make the following assumptions on the constraint sets Ki
and the functions fi.
Assumption 1. For each i = 1, . . . , N , the set Ki ⊂ Rn is compact and convex. Each function
fi(xi, y) is continuously differentiable in (xi, y) over some open set containing the set Ki×K¯, while
each function xi 7→ fi(xi, x¯) is convex over the set Ki.
3Note that the transportation costs are assumed to be zero.
Under Assumption 1, the (sufficient) equilibrium conditions of the Nash game in (2) can be
specified as a variational inequality problem VI(K,φ) (cf. [11]). Recall that VI(K,φ) requires
determining a point x∗ ∈ K such that
(x− x∗)Tφ(x∗)≥0 for all x ∈ K,
where
φ(x) ,

 ∇x1f1(x1, x¯)...
∇xN fN(xN , x¯)

 , K = N∏
i=1
Ki, (5)
with x , (xT1 , . . . , x
T
N )
T , xi ∈ Ki for all i, and x¯ defined by (3). Note that, by Assumption 1, the
set K is a compact and convex set in RnN , and the mapping φ : K → RnN is continuous. To
emphasize the particular form of the mapping φ, we define Fi(xi, x¯) as follows:
Fi(xi, x¯) = ∇xifi(xi, x¯) for all i = 1, . . . , N. (6)
The mapping F (x, u) is given by
F (x, u) ,

 F1(x1, u)...
FN (xN , u)

 , (7)
where the component maps Fi : Ki × K¯ → Rn are given by (6). With this notation, we have
φ(x) = F (x, x¯) for all x ∈ K. (8)
Next, we make an assumption on the mapping φ(x).
Assumption 2. The mapping φ(x) is strictly monotone over K, i.e.,
(φ(x)− φ(x′))T (x− x′) > 0, for all x, x′ ∈ K, where x 6= x′.
Assumption 1 allows us to claim the existence of a Nash equilibrium, while Assumption 2 allows
us to claim the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Consider the aggregative Nash game defined in (2). Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2
hold. Then, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Assumption 1, the set K is compact and φ is continuous. It follows from Corollary
2.2.5 [11] that VI(K,φ) has a solution. By the strict monotonicity of φ(x), VI(K,φ) has at most
one solution based on Theorem 2.3.3 [11] and uniqueness follows.
Strict monotonicity assumptions on the mapping are seen to hold in a range of practical problem
settings, including Nash-Cournot games [22], rate allocation problems [2, 3, 61, 62], amongst others.
We now state our assumptions on the mappings Fi, which are related to the coordinate mappings
of φ in (5).
Assumption 3. Each mapping Fi(xi, u) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in u over K¯, for every
fixed xi ∈ Ki i.e., for some L¯i > 0 and for all z1, z2 ∈ K¯,
‖Fi(xi, z1)− Fi(xi, z2)‖ ≤ L¯i‖z1 − z2‖,
where K¯ is as defined in (1).
One would naturally question whether such assumptions are seen to hold in practical instances
of aggregative games. We will show in section 6 that the assumptions are satisfied for the Nash-
Cournot game described in Example 1.
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to reiterate the motivation for the present work. In the
context of continuous-strategy Nash games, when the mapping φ satisfies a suitable monotonicity
property over K, then a range of distributed projection-based schemes [11, 3, 2, 42, 43] and their
regularized variants schemes [61, 62, 21, 22] can be constructed. In all of these instances, every
agent should be able to observe the aggregate x¯ of the agent decisions. In this paper, we assume
that this aggregate cannot be observed and no central entity exists that can globally broadcast
this quantity at any time. Yet, when agents are connected in some manner, then a given agent
may communicate locally with their neighbors and generate estimates of the aggregate decisions.
Under this restriction, we are interested in designing algorithms for computing an equilibrium of
an aggregative Nash game (2).
3 Distributed Synchronous Algorithm
In this section we develop a distributed synchronous algorithm for equilibrium computation of the
game in (2) that relies on agents constructing an estimate of the aggregate by mixing information
drawn from local neighbors and making a subsequent projection step. In Section 3.1, we describe the
scheme and provide some preliminary results in Section 3.2. This section concludes in Section 3.3
with an analysis of the convergence of the proposed scheme.
3.1 Outline of Algorithm
Our algorithm equips each agent in the network with a protocol that mandates that every agent
exchange information with its neighbors, and subsequently update its decision and the estimate of
the aggregate decisions, simultaneously. We employ a synchronous time model which can contend
with a time varying connectivity graph. Consequently, in this section we consider a time varying
network to model agent’s communications in time. More specifically, let Ek be the set of underlying
undirected edges between agents and let Gk = (N , Ek) denote the connectivity graph at time k.
Let Ni(k) denote the set of agents who are immediate neighbors of agent i at time k that can send
information to i, assuming that i ∈ Ni(k) for all i ∈ N and all k ≥ 0. Mathematically, Ni(k) can
be expressed as:
Ni(k) = {j : {i, j} ∈ Ek}.
We make the following assumption on the graph Gk = (N , Ek).
Assumption 4. There exists an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph (N ,⋃Qℓ=1 Eℓ+k) is connected for
all k ≥ 0.
This assumption ensures that the intercommunication intervals are bounded for agents that
communicate directly; i.e., every agent sends information to each of its neighboring agents at least
once every Q time intervals. This assumption has been commonly used in distributed algorithms
on networks, starting with [57].
(a) Connectivity graph at one instant (b) Connectivity graph at another instant
Figure 2: A depiction of an undirected communication network.
Due to incomplete information at any point, an agent only has an estimate of x¯ in contrast to
the actual x¯. We describe how an agent may build this estimate. Let xki be the iterate and v
k
i be
the estimate of the average of the decisions xk1, . . . , x
k
N for agent i at the end of the kth iteration.
At the beginning of the (k + 1)st iteration, agent i receives the estimates vkj from its neighbors
j ∈ Ni(k + 1). Using this information, agent i aligns its intermediate estimate according to the
following rule:
vˆki =
∑
j∈Ni(k)
wij(k)v
k
j , (9)
where wij(k) is the nonnegative weight that agent i assigns to agent j’s estimate. By specifying
wij = 0 for j 6∈ Ni(k) we can write:
vˆki =
N∑
j=1
wij(k)v
k
j with v
0
j = x
0
j for all j = 1, . . . , N.
Using this aligned average estimate vˆki and its own iterate x
k
i , agent i updates its iterate and average
estimate as follows:
xk+1i := ΠKi [x
k
i − αkFi(xki , Nvˆki )], (10)
vk+1i := vˆ
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki , (11)
where αk is the stepsize, ΠKi(u) denotes the Euclidean projection of a vector u onto the set Ki and
Fi is as defined in (6). The quantity Nvˆ
k
i in (10) is the aggregate estimate that agent i uses instead
of the true estimate
∑N
i=1 x
k
i of the agent decisions at time k. Under suitable conditions on the
agents weights wij(k) and the stepsize αk, the iterate vector (x
k
1 , . . . , x
k
N ) can converge to a Nash
equilibrium point (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) and the estimates Nvˆ
k
i in (10) will converge to the true aggregate
value
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i at the equilibrium. These assumptions are given below.
Assumption 5. Let W (k) be the weight matrix with entries wij(k). For all i ∈ N and all k ≥ 0,
the following hold:
(i) wij(k) ≥ δ for all j ∈ Ni(k) and wij(k) = 0 for j 6∈ Ni(k);
(ii)
∑N
j=1wij(k) = 1 for all i;
(iii)
∑N
i=1 wij(k) = 1 for all j.
Assumption 5 essentially requires every player to assign a positive weight to the information
received from its neighbor. Following Assumption 5 (ii)-(iii), the matrix W (k) is doubly stochastic.
We point the reader to [35] for the examples and a detailed discussion of the weights satisfying the
preceding assumption.
Assumption 6. The stepsize αk is chosen such that the following hold:
(i) The sequence {αk} is monotonically non-increasing i.e., αk+1 ≤ αk for all k;
(ii)
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞;
(iii)
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <∞.
Such an assumption is satisfied for a stepsize of the form αk = (k + 1)
−b where 0.5 < b ≤ 1.
3.2 Preliminary Results
We next provide some auxiliary results for the weight matrices and the estimates generated by the
method. We introduce the transition matrices Φ(k, s) from time s to k > s, as follows:
Φ(k, s) =W (k)W (k − 1) · · ·W (s+ 1)W (s) for 0 ≤ s < k,
where Φ(k, k) =W (k) for all k. Let [Φ(k, s)]ij denote the (i, j)th entry of the matrix Φ(k, s), and let
1 ∈ RN be the column vector with all entries equal to 1. We next state a result on the convergence
properties of the matrix Φ(k, s). The result can be found in [34] (Corollary 1).
Lemma 1 ([57] Lemma 5.3.1). Let Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then the following hold:
(i) limk→∞Φ(k, s) = 1N 11
T for all s ≥ 0.
(ii) The convergence rate of Φ(k, s) is geometric; specifically, we have
∣∣[Φ(k, s)]ij − 1N ∣∣ ≤ θβk−s
for all k ≥ s ≥ 0 and for all i and j, where θ = (1− δ
4N2
)−2 and β = (1− δ
4N2
)
1
Q .
Next, we state some results which will allow us to claim the convergence of the algorithm. These
results involve the average of the estimates vki , i ∈ N , defined by yk:
yk =
1
N
N∑
i=1
vki for all k ≥ 0. (12)
As we proceed to show, yk will play a key role in establishing the convergence of the iterates
produced by the algorithm in (10)–(11). One important property of yk is that we have yk =
1
N
∑N
j=1 x
k
j for all k ≥ 0. Thus, yk not only captures the average belief of the agents in the network
but it also represents the true average information. This property of the true average yk has been
shown in [48] within the proof of Lemma 5.2 for a different setting, and it is given in the following
lemma for sake of clarity.
Lemma 2. Let W (k) be such that
∑N
j=1[W (k)]ji = 1 for every i and k. Then, y
k = 1N
∑N
i=1 x
k
i
for all k ≥ 0, where yk is defined by (12).
Proof. It suffices to show that for all k ≥ 0,
N∑
j=1
vkj =
N∑
j=1
xkj . (13)
We show this by induction on k. For k = 0 relation (13) holds trivially, as we have initialized the
beliefs with v0j = x
0
j for all j. Assuming relation (13) holds for k−1, as the induction step, we have
N∑
j=1
vkj =
N∑
j=1
(vˆk−1j + x
k
j − xk−1j )
=
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
[W (k − 1)]jivk−1i +
N∑
j=1
(xkj − xk−1j )
=
N∑
i=1
vk−1i +
N∑
j=1
(xkj − xk−1j ),
where the first equality follows from (11), the second inequality is a consequence of the mixing
relationship articulated by (9), and the last equality follows from
∑N
j=1[W (k)]ji = 1 for every i and
k. Furthermore, using the induction hypothesis, we have
∑N
j=1(x
k
j −xk−1j ) =
∑N
j=1 x
k
j −
∑N
j=1 v
k−1
j ,
thus implying that
∑N
j=1 v
k
j =
∑N
j=1 x
k
j .
As a consequence of Lemma 2, Assumptions 1 and 3, we have the following result which will
be often used in the sequel.
Lemma 3. Let W (k) be such that
∑N
j=1[W (k)]ji = 1 for every i and k. Also, let Assumptions 1
and 3 hold. Then, there exists a constant C such that
‖Fi(xki , Nyk)‖ ≤ C, ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖ ≤ C for all i and k ≥ 0.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we have Nyk =
∑N
i=1 x
k
i = x¯k ∈ K¯, where K¯ is compact since each Ki is
compact (Assumption 1). Since each Fi is continuous over Ki × K¯, the first inequality follows. To
show that {Fi(xki , Nvˆki )} is bounded, we write
‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖ ≤ ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk)‖+ ‖Fi(xki , Nyk)‖.
Using the Lipschitz property of Fi of Assumption 3, we obtain
‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖ ≤ L¯iN‖vˆki − yk‖+ ‖Fi(xki , Nyk)‖.
Let Kˆ be the convex hull of the union set ∪iKi. Note that vˆki , yk ∈ Kˆ for all k and that Kˆ is
compact (since each Ki is compact).
4 Thus, {‖vˆki − yk‖} is bounded. As already established,
{Fi(xki , Nyk)} is also bounded, implying that {Fi(xki , Nvˆki )} is bounded as well.
4Though yk ∈ K¯, we cannot claim the same for vˆki .
In the following lemma, we establish an error bound on the norm ‖yk − vˆki ‖ which plays an
important role in our analysis.
Lemma 4. Let Assumptions 1–5 hold, and let yk be defined by (12). Then, we have
‖yk − vˆki ‖ ≤ θβkM + θNC
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1 for all i ∈ N and all k ≥ 1,
where vˆki is defined in (9), θ = (1 − δ4N2 )−2, β = (1 − δ4N2 )
1
Q , M =
∑N
j=1maxxj∈Kj ‖xj‖ and C
denotes the bound in Lemma 3.
Proof. Using the definitions of vk+1i and vˆ
k
i given in Eqs. (11) and (9), respectively, we have
vk+1i =
N∑
j=1
wij(k)v
k
j + x
k+1
i − xki ,
which through an iterative recursion leads to
vk+1i =
N∑
j=1
wij(k)
(
N∑
ℓ=1
wjℓ(k − 1)vk−1ℓ + xkj − xk−1j
)
+ xk+1i − xki
=
N∑
ℓ=1
[Φ(k, k − 1)]iℓvk−1ℓ +
N∑
j=1
[Φ(k, k)]ij
(
xkj − xk−1j
)
+ xk+1i − xki
= · · ·
=
N∑
ℓ=1
[Φ(k, 0)]iℓv
0
ℓ +
k∑
s=1

 N∑
j=1
[Φ(k, s)]ij(x
s
j − xs−1j )

+ xk+1i − xki .
The preceding relation can be rewritten as:
vk+1i − xk+1i + xki =
N∑
ℓ=1
[Φ(k, 0)]iℓv
0
ℓ +
k∑
s=1

 N∑
j=1
[Φ(k, s)]ij(x
s
j − xs−1j )

 .
By the definition of vk+1i in Eq. (11), we have vˆ
k
i = v
k+1
i − xk+1i + xki , through which we get
vˆki =
N∑
ℓ=1
[Φ(k, 0)]iℓv
0
ℓ +
k∑
s=1

 N∑
j=1
[Φ(k, s)]ij(x
s
j − xs−1j )

 . (14)
Now, consider yk which may be written as follows:
yk = yk−1 + (yk − yk−1) = · · · = y0 +
k∑
s=1
(ys − ys−1).
By Lemma 2 we have ys = 1N
∑N
j=1 x
s
j for all s ≥ 0, which implies
yk = y0 +
k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
1
N
(
xsj − xs−1j
)
=
N∑
ℓ=1
1
N
v0ℓ +
k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
1
N
(
xsj − xs−1j
)
, (15)
where the last equality follows by the definition of y0 (see (12)).
From relations (14) and (15) we have
‖yk − vˆki ‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
ℓ=1
(
1
N
− [Φ(k, 0)]iℓ
)
v0ℓ +
k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
(
1
N
− [Φ(k, s)]ij
)(
xsj − xs−1j
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
N∑
ℓ=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N − [Φ(k, 0)]iℓ
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥v0ℓ∥∥+ k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N − [Φ(k, s)]ij
∣∣∣∣ ∥∥∥xsj − xs−1j ∥∥∥
≤
N∑
ℓ=1
βk
∥∥v0ℓ∥∥+ k∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
βk−s
∥∥∥xsj − xs−1j ∥∥∥ (16)
where the last inequality follows from
∣∣ 1
N − [Φ(k, s)]ij
∣∣ ≤ θβk−s for all 0 ≤ s ≤ k (cf. Lemma 1).
Now, we estimate ‖xsi − xs−1i ‖. From relation (10) we see that for any s ≥ 1,
‖xsi − xs−1i ‖ = ‖ΠKi [xs−1i − αs−1Fi(xs−1i , Nvˆs−1i )]− xs−1i ‖
≤ ‖xs−1i − αs−1Fi(xs−1i , Nvˆs−1i )− xs−1i ‖
= αs−1‖Fi(xs−1i , Nvˆs−1i )‖
≤ Cαs−1, (17)
where the first inequality follows by the non-expansive property of projection map, and the second
inequality follows by Lemma 3. Combining (17) and (16), we have
‖yk − vˆki ‖ ≤ θβk
N∑
ℓ=1
‖v0ℓ ‖+ θN
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1C ≤ θβkM + θNC
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1,
where in the last inequality, we use v0ℓ = x
0
ℓ ∈ Kℓ and M =
∑N
ℓ=1maxxℓ∈Kℓ ‖x0ℓ‖, which is finite
since each Kℓ is a compact set (cf. Assumption 1).
From the right hand side of the expression in Lemma 4, it is apparent that the parameter for
network connectivity, Q (cf. Assumption 4) determines the rate of convergence of player’s estimate
of the aggregate to the actual aggregate. If the network connectivity is poor, Q is large implying β
is close to 1 resulting in a slower convergence rate.
3.3 Convergence theory
In this subsection, under our assumptions, we prove that the sequence produced by the proposed
algorithm does indeed converge to the unique Nash equilibrium, which exists by Proposition 1. Our
next proposition provides the main convergence result for the algorithm. Prior to providing this
result, we state two lemmas that will be employed in proving the required result, the first being a
supermartingale convergence result (see for example [44, Lemma 11, Pg. 50]) and the second being
[47, Lemma 3.1(b)].
Lemma 5. Let Vk, uk, βk and γk be non-negative random variables adapted to some σ-algebra Fk.
If almost surely
∑∞
k=0 uk <∞,
∑∞
k=0 βk <∞, and
E[Vk+1 | Fk] ≤ (1 + uk)Vk − γk + βk for all k ≥ 0,
then almost surely Vk converges and
∑∞
k=0 γk <∞.
Lemma 6. [47, Lemma 3.1(b)] Let {ζk} be a non-negative scalar sequence. If
∑∞
k=0 ζk < ∞ and
0 < β < 1, then
∑∞
k=0
(∑k
s=0 β
k−sζs
)
<∞.
In what follows, we use xk to denote the vector with components xki , i = 1, . . . , N , i.e., x
k =
(xk1 , . . . , x
k
N ) and, similarly, we write x
∗ for the vector (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ).
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1–6 hold. Then, the sequence {xk} generated by the method
(10)–(11) converges to the (unique) solution x∗ of VI(K,φ).
Proof. By Proposition 1, VI(K,φ) has a unique solution x∗ ∈ K. When x∗ solves the variational
inequality problem VI(K,φ), the following relation holds x∗ = ΠKi [x∗i − αkFi(x∗i , x¯∗)] (see [11,
Proposition 1.5.8, p. 83]). From this relation and the non-expansive property of projection operator,
we see that
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 = ‖ΠKi [xki − αkFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− x∗i ‖2
= ‖ΠKi [xki − αkFi(xki , Nvˆki )]−ΠKi [x∗i − αkFi(x∗i , x¯∗)]‖2
≤ ‖xki − x∗i − αk(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))‖2.
By expanding the last term, we obtain the following expression:
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
− 2αk (Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
. (18)
To estimate Term 1, we use the triangle inequality and the identity (a + b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2), which
yields
Term 1 ≤ 2‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖2 + 2‖Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2 ≤ C˜ with C˜ = 2C2 + 2 max
(xi,x¯)∈Ki×K¯
‖Fi(xi, x¯)‖2,
where C is such that ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖ ≤ C for all i and k (cf. Lemma 3) and max(xi,x¯)∈Ki×K¯ ‖Fi(xi, x¯)‖
is finite by Assumption 1. Next, we consider Term 2. By adding and subtracting Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k) in
Term 2, where yk is defined by (12), we have
Term 2 =
(
Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(xki , Nyk)
)T
(xki − x∗i ) +
(
Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)
)T
(xki − x∗i ).
By applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, i.e. aT b ≥ −‖a‖‖b‖, to the first term on the right hand
side of the preceding relation and the Lipschitz continuity of Fi(xi, u) in u (cf. Assumption 3), we
see that
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(xki , Nyk))T (xki − x∗i ) ≥ −‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk)‖ · ‖xki − x∗i ‖
≥ −L¯iN‖vˆki − yk‖ · ‖xki − x∗i ‖
≥ −2L¯iMN‖vˆki − yk‖,
where in the last inequality we use xki , x
∗
i ∈ Ki and the compactness of Ki (cf. Assumption 1) and
M ≥ maxxi∈Ki ‖xi‖ for all i. Therefore, we have
Term 2 ≥ −2L¯iMN‖vˆki − yk‖+
(
Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)
)T
(xki − x∗i ).
By substituting the preceding estimates of Term 1 and Term 2 in (18), we obtain
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + C˜α2k + 4αkL¯iMN‖vˆki − yk‖
− 2αk
(
Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)
)T
(xki − x∗i ).
Summing over all agents from i = 1 to i = N , yields
N∑
i=1
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤
N∑
i=1
‖xki − x∗i ‖2 +NC˜α2k + 4αkMN
N∑
i=1
L¯i‖vˆki − yk‖
− 2αk
N∑
i=1
(
Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)
)T
(xki − x∗i ).
Using Nyk =
∑N
i=1 x
k
i (see Lemma 2) and letting x¯
k =
∑N
i=1 x
k
i , we have for all k ≥ 0,
‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 +NC˜α2k + 4αkMN
N∑
i=1
L¯i‖vˆki − yk‖
− 2αk
(
φ(xk)− φ(x∗)
)T
(xk − x∗), (19)
where we also use the fact that Fi(xi, x¯) is a coordinate map for the mapping φ(x) = F (x, x¯) (see (7)
and (8)). To claim that the sequence {xk} converges to x∗, we apply Lemma 5 (for the deterministic
sequences) to relation (19). To apply this lemma, since
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < ∞ by Assumption 6, we only
need to prove
∞∑
k=0
αk‖vˆki − yk‖ <∞ for all i ∈ N . (20)
In view of Lemma 4, we have
‖yk − vˆki ‖ ≤ θβkM + θNC
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1 for all i ∈ N and all k ≥ 1,
so it suffices to prove that
∞∑
k=1
αk
(
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1
)
<∞ and
∞∑
k=1
αkβ
k <∞.
Using αk ≤ αs for all k ≥ s (Assumption 6), for the series
∑∞
k=1 αk
(∑k
s=1 β
k−sαs−1
)
we have
∞∑
k=1
αk
(
k∑
s=1
βk−sαs−1
)
=
∞∑
k=1
(
k∑
s=1
βk−sαkαs−1
)
≤
∞∑
k=1
(
k∑
s=1
βk−sα2s−1
)
.
We now use Lemma 6, from which by letting ζs = α
2
s we can see that
∑∞
k=1 αk
(∑k
s=1 β
k−sαs−1
)
<
∞. To establish the convergence of ∑∞k=0 αkβk, we note that αk ≤ α0 (Assumption 6), implying
that
∑∞
k=0 αkβ
k ≤ α0
∑∞
k=0 β
k <∞ since 0 < β < 1. Thus, relation (20) is valid.
As relation (19) satisfies the conditions of (the deterministic case of) Lemma 5, it follows that
{‖xk − x∗‖} is a convergent sequence, (21)
and
∞∑
k=0
αk(φ(x
k)− φ(x∗))T (xk − x∗) <∞. (22)
Since {xk} ⊂ K and K is compact (Assumption 1), {xk} has accumulation points in K. By (22)
and
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞ it follows that (φ(xk) − φ(x∗))T (xk − x∗) → 0 along a subsequence, say {xkℓ}.
This observation, together with the strict monotonicity of φ, implies that {xkℓ} → x∗ as ℓ → ∞.
To claim ‖xk−x∗‖ → 0, we proceed by contradiction and assume that ‖xk−x∗‖ does not converge
to 0. Then there exists an ǫ > 0 and a subsequence {xnl} such that ‖xnl −x∗‖ ≥ ǫ for l sufficiently
large. But since the set is bounded, there exists a further subsequence which converges to some x˜.
By relation (21), the sequence {xk} is convergent and therefore, it must be that x˜ = x∗ and the
entire sequence {xk} must converge to x∗.
Though it is difficult to make a statement on the rate of convergence for the result of Proposi-
tion 2, the network connectivity plays an important role in determining the rate as already discussed
for the results of Lemma 4. Indeed, if β is close to 1, which is the case for a network with poor
connectivity, players take longer to converge on their estimate of the true aggregate, thereby taking
it longer to converge on their optimal decision.
4 Distributed Asynchronous Algorithm
In this section, we propose a distributed gossip-based algorithm for computing an equilibrium of
aggregative Nash game, as defined by (2). In a gossip protocol, the information is propagated by
running a round of information exchange between a randomly chosen player who communicates
with another player chosen at random. A more detailed description of the algorithm and some
preliminary results are provided in section 4.1. The global convergence of the algorithm is examined
in section 4.2, while constant steplength error bounds are provided in section 4.3.
4.1 Outline of Algorithm
In the proposed algorithm, agents perform their estimate and iterate updates the same as in the
synchronous algorithm (10)–(11), but the updates occur asynchronously. As a mechanism for gen-
erating asynchronous updates we employ the gossip model for agent communications [7]. Together
with the asynchronous updates, we allow the agents to use uncoordinated stepsize values by letting
each agent choose a stepsize based on its own information-update frequency. To accommodate
these updates and stepsize selections, we model the agent connectivity structure by an undirected
static graph G(N , E), with node i ∈ N being agent i and E being the set of undirected edges among
the agents. When {i, j} ∈ E , the agents i and j may talk to each other. We let Ni denote the set
of neighbors of agent i, i.e., Ni = {j | {i, j} ∈ E}. We use the following assumption for the graph
G(N , E).
pij
Figure 3: A depiction of a gossip communication.
Assumption 7. The undirected graph G(N , E) is connected.
We use a gossip protocol to model agent communication and exchange of the estimates of the
aggregate x¯. In this model, each agent is assumed to have a local clock which ticks according to a
Poisson process with rate 1. At a tick of its clock, an agent i wakes up and contacts its neighbor
j ∈ Ni with probability pij . The agents’ clocks processes can be equivalently modeled as a single
(virtual) clock which ticks according to a Poisson process with rate N . We assume that only one
agent wakes up at each tick of the global clock, and we let Zk denote kth tick time of the global
Poisson process. We discretize time so that instant k corresponds to the time-slot [Zk−1, Zk). At
each time k, every agent i has its iterate xki and estimate v
k
i of the average of the current aggregate.
We let Ik denote the agent whose clock ticked at time k and we let Jk be the agent contacted by
the agent Ik, where Jk is a neighbor of agent Ik, i.e., Jk ∈ NIk . At time k, agents Ik and Jk
exchange their estimates vk
Ik
and vk
Jk
and compute intermediate estimates:
vˆki =
vk
Ik
+ vk
Jk
2
for i ∈ {Ik, Jk}, (23)
and update their iterates and estimates of the aggregate average, as follows:
xk+1i := ΠKi [x
k
i − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]
vk+1i := vˆ
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki
}
for i ∈ {Ik, Jk}, (24)
where αk,i is the stepsize for agent i and Fi(xi, y) = ∇xifi(xi, y). The other agents do nothing, i.e.,
vˆki = v
k
i , x
k+1
i = x
k
i , and v
k+1
i = v
k
i for i 6∈ {Ik, Jk}. (25)
As seen from the preceding update relations, the agents perform the same updates as in the syn-
chronous algorithm (10)–(11), but instead of all agents updating, only two randomly selected agents
update their estimates and iterates, while the other agents do not update.
We now rewrite the update steps more compactly. To capture the step in (23), we define the
weight matrix W (k):
W (k) = I− 1
2
(eIk − eJk)(eIk − eJk)T , (26)
where I stands for the identity matrix, ei is N -dimensional vector with ith entry equal to 1, and
the other entries equal to 0. By using W (k) we can rewrite the intermediate estimate update (23),
as follows: for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
vˆki =
N∑
j=1
[W (k)]ijv
k
j for all k ≥ 1, with v0i = x0i , (27)
where x0i ∈ Ki, i = 1, . . . , N , are initial (random) agent decisions. To rewrite the iterate xk+1i
update (or no update) compactly for all agents, we let 1{i∈S} denote the indicator of the event
{i ∈ S}. Then, the update relations in (24) and (25) can be written as:
xk+1i =
(
ΠKi [x
k
i − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki
)
1{i∈{Ik,Jk}} + x
k
i , (28)
vk+1i = vˆ
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki , (29)
Note that only agents i ∈ {Ik, Jk} update since 1{i∈{Ik,Jk}} = 0 when i 6∈ {Ik, Jk} and, hence,
xk+1i = x
k
i and v
k+1
i = vˆ
k
i with vˆ
k
i = v
k
i (by (27)).
We allow agents to use uncoordinated stepsizes that are based on the frequency of the agent
updates. Specifically, agent i uses the stepsize αk,i =
1
Γk(i)
, where Γk(i) denotes the number of
updates that agent i has executed up to and including at time k. These stepsizes are of the order
of 1k in a long run [45, 33]. To formalize this result, we need to introduce the probabilities of agents
updates. We let pi denote the probability of the event that agent i updates, i.e. {i ∈ {Ik, Jk}}, for
which we have
pi =
1
N

1 + ∑
j∈Ni
pji

 for all i ∈ N ,
where pji > 0 is the probability that agent i is contacted by its neighbor j. The long term estimates
for αk,i that we use in our analysis are given in the following lemma (cf. [33], Lemma 3), the proof
of which is provided in the appendix for completeness.
Lemma 7. Let Assumption 7 hold, and let pˆ = 1 +min{i,j}∈E pij and αk,i = 1/Γk(i) for all k and
i. Then, for any q ∈ (0, 1/2) and for every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a sufficiently large k˜(ω) = k˜(q,N)
such that we have for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N ,
αk,i ≤ 2
kpi
and
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2k3/2−q pˆ2 .
Note that k˜(ω) is contingent on the sample path corresponding to ω. More precisely, we claim
the following:
P
[
ω : αk,i ≤ 2
kpi
for k ≥ k˜(ω)
]
= 1.
Based on Lemma 7, we provide the next corollary without a proof.
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 7 hold, and let pˆ = 1 + min{i,j}∈E pij and αk,i = 1/Γk(i) for all k
and i. Then for all i ∈ N , the following hold with probability one:
(a)
∞∑
k=1
αk,i
k
<∞; (b)
∞∑
k=1
α2k,i <∞; (c)
∞∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
Another useful result is provided in [45, Lemma 1], and stated below in a suitable form.
Lemma 8. Let G(N , E) be a graph that satisfies Assumption 7. LetW be an N×N random stochas-
tic matrix such that E[W ] is doubly stochastic and E[W ]ij > 0 whenever {i, j} ∈ E. Furthermore,
let the diagonal elements of W be positive almost surely. Then, for the matrix D =W − 1N 11TW ,
there exists a scalar λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
E[‖Dz‖2] ≤ λ‖z‖2 for all z ∈ RN .
The random matrices W (k) in (26) are in fact doubly stochastic and thus, W¯ = E[W (k)]
is doubly stochastic. Moreover, it can be easily seen that W¯ij > 0 whenever {i, j} ∈ E . In
addition, W (k) has positive diagonal entries. Hence, Lemma 8 applies to random matrices W (k).
However, since each W (k) is in fact doubly stochastic, we have 1TW (k) = 1T , implying that
W (k) − 1N 11TW (k) = W (k) − 1N 11T . Hence, using this observation and Lemma 8, we find that
there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that for the matrix D(k) =W (k)− 1N 11T we have
E[‖D(k) z‖2] ≤ λ‖z‖2 for all z ∈ RN . (30)
By Jensen’s inequality we have |E[X]| ≤
√
E[X2] for any random variable X (with a finite expec-
tation), which when applied to relation (30) yields
E[‖D(k) z‖] ≤
√
λ ‖z‖ for all z ∈ RN . (31)
The value of second largest eigenvalue λ controls the rate at which information is dispensed over the
network. A network with large λ will have players agreeing faster on their estimate of the aggregate
than a network with a smaller λ. In Section 6 we consider a variety of networks to demonstrate
the impact of network topology through λ on the rate of convergence.
4.2 Convergence Theory
In this section we establish the convergence of the asynchronous algorithm (27)–(29) with the agent
specific diminishing stepsize of the form αk,i =
1
Γk(i)
. To take account of the history, we introduce
Fk to denote the σ−algebra generated by the entire history up to k. More precisely
Fk = F0 ∪ {I l, J l; 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1} for all k ≥ 2,
with F1 = F0{x0i , i ∈ N}. Thus, given Fk, the vectors vki and xki are fully determined. First we
state several result which we will use to claim the convergence of the algorithm, as well as to analyze
the error bounds.
In what follows, we will use a vector-component based analysis. To this end, we introduce [z]ℓ
to denote the ℓ-th component of a vector z ∈ Rn, with ℓ = 1, . . . , n. A component-wise update of
each vk+1i in (29) is given by: for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
[vk+1i ]ℓ =
N∑
j=1
[W (k)]ij [v
k
j ]ℓ + [x
k+1
i − xki ]ℓ for ℓ = 1, . . . , n.
We collect all ℓth coordinates of the vectors vk1 , . . . , v
k
N and let v
k(ℓ) = ([vk1 ]ℓ, . . . , [v
k
N ]ℓ)
T . We
similarly do for the vectors xk1 , . . . , x
k
N and let x
k(ℓ) = ([xk1 ]ℓ, . . . , [x
k
N ]ℓ)
T . Using the vectors vk(ℓ)
and xk(ℓ), we can rewrite the preceding relation as follows:
vk+1(ℓ) =W (k)vk(ℓ) + ζk+1(ℓ) with ζk+1(ℓ) = xk+1(ℓ)− xk(ℓ) for all ℓ = 1, . . . , n. (32)
We have the following result for vk+1(ℓ) for any ℓ.
Lemma 9. Let Assumptions 1–3 and Assumption 7 hold. Then, for all ℓ = 1, . . . , n and k ≥ 0,
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖+
√
2C
N∑
i=1
αk,i,
where D(k) =W (k)− 1N 11T and C is a constant as in Lemma 3.
Proof. We fix an arbitrary coordinate ℓ. By the decision update rule of (28), the ith coordinate of
the vector ζk+1(ℓ) is [ζk+1(ℓ)]i = [
(
ΠKi [x
k
i − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki
)
1{i∈{Ik,Jk}}]ℓ. Since yk+1 is the
average of the vectors vk+1i , from (32) for the ℓth coordinate of this vector we obtain
[yk+1]ℓ =
1
N
1vk+1(ℓ) =
1
N
(
1TW (k)vk(ℓ) + 1T ζk+1(ℓ)
)
,
which together with (32) leads us to
vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1 =
(
W (k)− 1
N
11TW (k)
)
vk(ℓ) +
(
I− 1
N
11T
)
ζk+1(ℓ),
where I is the identity matrix. Note that each W (k) is a doubly stochastic matrix i.e., W (k)1 = 1
and 1TW (k) = 1T . Thus, 1N 11
TW (k) = 1N 11
T . Furthermore, we have
(
W (k)− 1N 11T
)
1 = 0,
implying that (
W (k)− 1
N
11T
)
[yk]ℓ1 = 0.
By combining the preceding two relations, using 1N 11
TW (k) = 1N 11
T , and letting D(k) =W (k)−
1
N 11
T , we obtain
vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1 = D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1) +
(
I− 1
N
11T
)
ζk+1(ℓ).
Taking norms, we obtain
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖ +
∥∥∥∥
(
I− 1
N
11T
)
ζk+1(ℓ)
∥∥∥∥ . (33)
We next estimate the last term in (33). The matrix I− 1N 11T is a projection matrix (corresponds
to the projection on the subspace orthogonal to the vector 1), so ‖I− 1N 11T ‖ = 1, implying that∥∥∥∥
(
I− 1
N
11T
)
ζk+1(ℓ)
∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥I− 1N 11T
∥∥∥∥ ‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖ = ‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖. (34)
From the definition of ζk+1(ℓ) in (32), we see that
‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖2 =
∑
i∈{Ik ,Jk}
∥∥∥[ΠKi [xki − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki ]
ℓ
∥∥∥2 .
Using the non-expansive property of the projection operator and
α2k,i ≤
∑
i∈{Ik,Jk}
α2k,i ≤
N∑
i=1
α2k,i,
we have
‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖2 ≤
∑
i∈{Ik,Jk}
‖αk,i[Fi(xki , Nvˆki )]ℓ‖2 ≤
N∑
i=1
α2k,i
∑
i∈{Ik ,Jk}
‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖2.
By Lemma 3, ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )‖ ≤ C for all i, k and some C > 0. This and |{Ik, Jk}| = 2 imply
‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖2 ≤ 2C2∑Ni=1 α2k,i. By taking square roots we obtain
‖ζk+1(ℓ)‖ ≤
√
2C
√√√√ N∑
i=1
α2k,i ≤
√
2C
N∑
i=1
αk,i
which when combined with (33) and (34) yields
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖+
√
2C
N∑
i=1
αk,i.
Our result involves the average yk of the estimates vki , i ∈ N , which will be important in
establishing the convergence of the algorithm.
Lemma 10. Let Assumptions 1–3 and Assumption 7 hold. Let vki be given by (27) and (29),
respectively, and let yk = 1N
∑N
i=1 v
k
i . Then, we have
∞∑
k=1
1
k
‖vki − yk‖2 <∞ a.s. for all i ∈ N .
Proof. From Lemma 9, we obtain that the following holds for k ≥ 0 almost surely,
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖+
√
2C
N∑
i=1
αk,i.
By taking conditional expectations with respect to Fk, we obtain that the following holds almost
surely for all k:
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ | Fk] ≤ E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖ | Fk] +
√
2CE
[
N∑
i=1
αk,i | Fk
]
. (35)
Note that the expectation in the term on the right hand side is taken with respect to the randomness
in the matrix W (k) only. By relation (31), we have
E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖ | Fk] ≤
√
λ‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖,
which combined with (35) yields that the following holds for all k in an almost sure sense:
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ | Fk] ≤
√
λ‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖+
√
2C E
[
N∑
i=1
αk,i | Fk
]
. (36)
By multiplying both sides of (36) with 1k and by using
1
k+1 <
1
k we find that almost surely for
all k:
1
k + 1
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ | Fk] ≤
√
λ
k
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖+
√
2C E[
∑N
i=1 αk,i | Fk]
k
=
1
k
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖ − 1−
√
λ
k
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖
+
√
2C E
[
N∑
i=1
αk,i
k
| Fk
]
.
Since λ ∈ (0, 1) we have 1−√λ > 0 and∑k E [∑Ni=1 αk,ik | Fk] <∞ since∑k∑Ni=1 2k2pi <∞ with
probability one from Corollary 1, allowing for invoking the supermartingale convergence lemma
(Lemma 5). Therefore, we may conclude that
∞∑
k=1
1
k
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖ <∞ a.s.
Recalling that vk(ℓ) = ([vk1 ]ℓ, . . . , [v
k
N ]ℓ)
T , the preceding relation implies that
∞∑
k=1
1
k
∣∣∣[vki ]ℓ − [yk]ℓ∣∣∣ <∞ for all i ∈ N a.s.
The coordinate index ℓ was arbitrary, so the relation is also true for every coordinate index ℓ =
1, . . . , n. In particular, since ‖vki − yk‖ ≤
∑n
ℓ=1 |[vki ]ℓ − [yk]ℓ| we have
∞∑
k=1
1
k
∥∥∥vki − yk∥∥∥ ≤ ∞∑
k=1
1
k
n∑
ℓ=1
|[vki ]ℓ − [yk]ℓ| <∞ for all i ∈ N a.s.
For the rest of the paper, we use xk to denote the vector with components xki , i = 1, . . . , N ,
i.e., xk = (xk1 , . . . , x
k
N ) and we write x
∗ for the vector (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ). We now show the convergence
of the algorithm. We have the following result, where x∗ denotes the unique Nash equilibrium of
the aggregative game in (2).
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1–3 and Assumption 7 hold. Then, the sequence {xk} generated
by the method (27)–(29) with the stepsize αk,i =
1
Γk(i)
converges to the (unique) x∗ of the game
almost surely.
Proof. Under strict monotonicity of the mapping and the compactness of K, uniqueness of the
equilibrium follows from Proposition 1. Then, by the definition of xk+1i we have
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 =
∥∥∥(ΠKi [xki − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki )1{i∈{Ik ,Jk}} + xki − x∗i∥∥∥2 .
Using x∗i = ΠKi [x
∗
i −αk,iFi(x∗i , x¯∗)] and the non-expansive property of the projection operator, we
have for i ∈ {Ik, Jk},
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xki − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )− xki − x∗i + αk,iFi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
= ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k,i‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
− 2αk,i(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
By expressing αk,i as αk,i =
(
αk,i − 1kpi
)
+ 1kpi , we have the following for all k:
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 = ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k,i‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
− 2
(
αk,i − 1
kpi
)
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )
− 2
kpi
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )
≤ ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k,i‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
+ 2
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )∣∣∣
− 2
kpi
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (37)
By Lemma 3 and Assumption 1 we can see that ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki ) − Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2 ≤ C1 for some scalar
C1, and for all i and k. Similarly, for the term in (37) involving the absolute value, we can see that
|(Fi(xki , Nvˆki ) − Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )| ≤ C2 for some scalar C2, and for all i and k. Substituting
these estimates in (37), we obtain
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k,iC1 + 2C2
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣
− 2
kpi
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (38)
For the last term in the preceding relation, by adding and subtracting Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k) and using
Nyk =
∑N
i=1 x
k
i = x¯
k (cf. Lemma 2), we write
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ) = (Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk))T (xki − x∗i )
+ (Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )
≥ −‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk)‖ ‖xki − x∗i ‖
+ (Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )
≥ −L¯iN‖vˆki − yk‖M + (Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )
where we use the Lipschitz property of the mapping Fi (Assumption 3), while M is a constant such
that maxxi,zi∈Ki ‖xi − zi‖ ≤ M for all i. The vector vˆki is a convex combination of vkj over j =
1, . . . , N(cf. (27)). Therefore, by the convexity of the norm, we have ‖vˆki −yk‖ ≤
∑N
j=1[W (k)]ij‖vkj −
yk‖, which yields
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ) ≥ −L¯iNM
N∑
j=1
[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖
+ (Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (39)
Finally, by combining relations (38) and (39) we obtain for i ∈ {Ik, Jk} and for all k ≥ 0,
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2k,iC1 + 2C2
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣+ 2kpi L¯iNM
N∑
j=1
[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖
− 2
kpi
(Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
Since xk+1i = x
k
i when i 6∈ {Ik, Jk}, it follows that ‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 = ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 for i 6∈ {Ik, Jk}. We
combine these two cases with the fact that agent i updates with probability pi and, thus obtain
almost surely for all i ∈ N and for all k
E[‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + C1E[α2k,i | Fk] + 2C2E
[∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ | Fk
]
(40)
+
2
k
L¯iNM
N∑
j=1
[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖ −
2
k
(Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
Summing relations (40) over i = 1, . . . , N , using the fact that W (k) is doubly stochastic and
recalling that Fi are coordinate maps for F and F (x, x¯) defines φ (cf. (7) and (8)), we further
obtain for all k:
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ ‖xk − x∗‖2 + C1E
[
N∑
i=1
α2k,i | Fk
]
+ 2C2E
[
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ | Fk
]
+
2
k
L¯iNM
N∑
j=1
‖vkj − yk‖ −
2
k
(φ(xk)− φ(x∗))T (xk − x∗), (41)
where pmin = mini pi and pmax = maxi pi. We now verify that we can apply the supermartingale
convergence result (cf. Lemma 5) to relation (41). From Corollary 1 it follows that
∞∑
k=1
(
C1E
[
N∑
i=1
α2k,i | Fk
]
+ 2C2E
[
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ | Fk
])
<∞.
Further from Lemma 10 it follows that
∑∞
k=1
∑N
i=1
1
k‖vki − yk‖ < ∞ almost surely. Thus, all
conditions of Lemma 5 are satisfied and we conclude that
{‖xk − x∗‖} converges a.s., (42)
∞∑
k=1
2
k
(φ(x)− φ(x∗))T (xk − x∗) <∞ a.s. (43)
Since {xk} ⊂ K andK is compact (Assumption 1), it follows that {xk} has an accumulation point in
K. By
∑∞
k=1
1
k =∞, relation (43) implies that (xk −x∗)T (φ(xk)−φ(x∗))→ 0 along a subsequence
almost surely, say {xkℓ}. Then, by the strict monotonicity of φ, it follows that {xkℓ} → x∗ as
ℓ→∞ almost surely. By (42), the entire sequence converges to x∗ almost surely.
4.3 Error Bounds for Constant Stepsize
In this section, we investigate the properties of the algorithm when agents employ a deterministic
constant, albeit uncoordinated, stepsize. More specifically, our interest lies in establishing error
bounds contingent on the deviation of stepsize across agents. Under this setting, the stepsize is
αk,i = αi in the update rule for agents’ decisions in (28), which reduces to
xk+1i =
(
ΠKi [x
k
i − αiFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki
)
1{i∈{Ik,Jk}} + x
k
i ,
where αi is a positive constant stepsize for agent i. It is worth mentioning that the rules for mixing
estimates (23) and updating estimates (29) are invariant under this modification. Also, we allow
agents to independently choose αi, thereby maintaining the complete decentralization feature of
the gossip algorithm. We begin by providing an updated estimate for the disagreement among the
agents. Our result is analogous to that of Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. Let Assumptions 1–3 and 7 hold. Consider {vki }, i = 1, . . . , N, that are generated by
algorithm in (27)–(29) with αk,i = αi. Then, for y
k = 1N
∑N
i=1 v
k
i we have
lim sup
k→∞
N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖2] ≤
2nα2maxC
2
(1−√λ)2 , lim supk→∞
N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖] ≤
√
2nNαmaxC
1−√λ , a.s.,
where αmax = maxi{αi}, C is the constant as in Lemma 3, and λ is as given in (30).
Proof. We fix an arbitrary index ℓ. By Lemma 9 with αk,i = αi, we have for all k ≥ 0,
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖ ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖+
√
2Cαmax, (44)
where D(k) =W (k)− 1N 11T and αmax = maxi αi. Note that by relation (31) we have
E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖] = E
[
E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖ | Fk]
]
≤
√
λE[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖]. (45)
Thus, by taking the expectation of both sides in (44), we obtain
E
[
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖
]
≤
√
λE
[
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖
]
+
√
2Cαmax for all k ≥ 0,
which by iterative recursion leads to
E
[
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖
]
≤
(√
λ
)k+1
E
[‖v0(ℓ)− [y0]ℓ1‖]+√2Cαmax k∑
s=0
(
√
λ)s for all k ≥ 0.
Thus, by letting k →∞, we obtain the following limiting result
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖] ≤
√
2Cαmax
1−√λ . (46)
By taking the squares of both sides in relation (44), we find
‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖2 ≤ ‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖2 + 2
√
2Cαmax‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖+ 2C2α2max.
Taking the expectation on both sides in the preceding relation and using estimate (45), we obtain
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖2] ≤ E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖2] + 2
√
2Cαmax
√
λE[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖] + 2C2α2max
≤ λE[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2] + 2
√
2Cαmax
√
λE[‖vk(ℓ)
− [yk]ℓ1‖] + 2C2α2max (47)
where the last inequality follows by
E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖2] = E
[
E[‖D(k)(vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1)‖2 | Fk]
]
≤ λE[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2],
which is a consequence of relation (30). Since vki and y
k are convex combinations of points in
K1, . . . ,KN and each Ki is compact, the sequence {‖vk+1(ℓ) − [yk+1]ℓ1‖} is bounded, implying
that so is the sequence {E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖]}. Thus, lim supk→∞ E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖2] exists,
and let us denote this limit by S. Letting k →∞ in relation (47) and using (46), we obtain
S ≤ λS +
(
2
√
λ
1−√λ + 1
)
2C2α2max = λS +
1 +
√
λ
1−√λ2C
2α2max,
which upon solving for S and recalling the notation yields
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖vk+1(ℓ)− [yk+1]ℓ1‖2] ≤ 1 +
√
λ
(1− λ)(1−√λ)2C
2α2max =
1
(1−√λ)2 2C
2α2max.
The preceding relation is true for any ℓ. Thus, since limsup is invariant under the index-shift, we
have
lim sup
k→∞
n∑
ℓ=1
E[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2] ≤
n∑
ℓ=1
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2] ≤ 2nC
2α2max
(1−√λ)2 ,
and by the linearity of the expectation, it follows
lim sup
k→∞
E
[
n∑
ℓ=1
‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2
]
≤ 2nC
2α2max
(1−√λ)2 .
Recalling that vector vk(ℓ) consists of the ℓth coordinates of the vectors vk1 , . . . , v
k
N (i.e., v
k(ℓ) =
([vk1 ]ℓ, . . . , [v
k
N ]ℓ)
T ), we see that ‖∑nℓ=1 ‖vk(ℓ)− [yk]ℓ1‖2 =∑Ni=1 ‖vk − yk‖2. Hence, the preceding
relation is equivalent to
lim sup
k→∞
N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖2] ≤
2nC2α2max
(1−√λ)2 ,
which is the first relation stated in the lemma. In particular, the preceding relation implies that
lim sup
k→∞
√√√√ N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖2] ≤
√
2nCαmax
1−√λ . (48)
On the other hand, by Holders’ inequality we have
N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖] ≤
√
N
√√√√ N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖2].
from which by taking the limit as k →∞ and using (48), we obtain
lim sup
k→∞
N∑
i=1
E[‖vki − yk‖] ≤
√
2nN Cαmax
1−√λ .
We now estimate the limiting error of the algorithm under the additional assumption of strong
monotonicity of the mapping φ. For this result, we also assume an additional Lipschitz property
for the maps Fi, as given below.
Assumption 8. Each mapping Fi(xi, u) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in xi over Ki, for every
fixed u ∈ K¯ i.e., for some Li > 0 and for all xi, yi ∈ Ki,
‖Fi(xi, u)− Fi(yi, u)‖ ≤ Li‖xi − yi‖.
We have the following result.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1–3, 7, and 8 hold, and let the mapping φ be strongly monotone
over the set K with a constant µ > 0, in the following sense:
(φ(x)− φ(y))T (x− y) ≥ µ‖x− y‖2 for all x, y ∈ K.
Consider the sequence {xk} generated by the method (27)–(29) with αk,i = αi. Suppose that the
stepsizes αi are such that
0 < 1− 2µpminαmin + 2pmax(max
i
Li)(αmax − αmin) < 1, (49)
where for i = 1, . . . , N , Li are Lipshitz constants from Assumption 8, αmax = max
i
αi, αmin =
min
i
αi, pmax = max
i
pi, and pmin = min
i
pi. Then, the following result holds
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
pmaxα
2
max
(
2C2N +BC
√
2nN
1−√λ
)
µpminαmin − pmax(maxi Li)(αmax − αmin) ,
where x∗ is the unique solution of VI(K,φ), C is as in Lemma 3, λ is as in (30), and B =
(maxi L¯i)NM with L¯i, i = 1, . . . , N , being the Lipschitz constants from Assumption 3, and M ≥
maxxi,zi∈Ki ‖xi − zi‖ for all i.
Proof. Since the map is strongly monotone, there is a unique solution x∗ ∈ K to VI(K,φ) (see
Theorem 2.3.3. in [11]). Then, by the definition of xk+1i we have
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 =
∥∥∥(ΠKi [xki − αiFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki )1{i∈{Ik ,Jk}} + xki − x∗i∥∥∥2 .
Using x∗i = ΠKi [x
∗
i − αiFi(x∗i , x¯∗)] and the non-expansive property of the projection operator, we
have for i ∈ {Ik, Jk},
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ ‖xki − αiFi(xki , Nvˆki )− xki − x∗i + αiFi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
= ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + α2i ‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2
− 2αi(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (50)
By using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2 and Lemma 3 we can see that
‖Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗)‖2 ≤ 4C2.
We now approximate the inner product term by adding and subtracting Fi(x
k
i , Ny
k) and using
yk =
∑N
i=1 x
k
i = x¯
k (see Lemma 2), to obtain
(Fi(x
k
i , Nvˆ
k
i )− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ) ≥− |(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk))T (xki − x∗i )|
+ (Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
By the Lipshitz property of the mapping Fi in Assumption 3, we have
|(Fi(xki , Nvˆki )− Fi(xki , Nyk))T (xki − x∗i )| ≤ L¯iN‖vˆki − yk‖ ‖xki − x∗i ‖ ≤ L¯iNM‖vˆki − yk‖,
where M ≥ maxxi,zi ‖xi − zi‖ for all i, which exists by compactness of each Ki. Upon combining
the preceding estimates with (50), we obtain
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + 4α2iC2 + 2αiL¯iNM‖vˆki − yk‖
− 2αi(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (51)
Now, we work with the last term in (51), by letting αmin = mini αi, and by adding and sub-
tracting 2αmin(Fi(x
k
i , x¯
k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ), we can see that
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + 4α2iC2 + 2αiL¯iNM‖vˆki − yk‖
+ 2(αi − αmin)|(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )|
− 2αmin(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ). (52)
By using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Lipschitz property of Fi given in Assumption 8,
we obtain
|(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i )| ≤ Li‖xki − x∗i ‖2. (53)
Further, by letting αmax = maxi αi, from (52) and (53) by collecting the common terms we have
for i ∈ {Ik, Jk},
‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 ≤ (1 + 2Li(αmax − αmin)) ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + 4α2iC2 + 2αiL¯iNM‖vˆki − yk‖
− 2αmin(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
The fact that xk+1i = x
k
i when i 6∈ {Ik, Jk} implies that ‖xk+1i −x∗i ‖2 = ‖xki −x∗i ‖2 for i 6∈ {Ik, Jk}.
Next, we take the expectation in (54), whereby we combine the preceding two cases and take into
account that agent i updates with probability pi, and obtain for all i ∈ N ,
E[‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1 + 2piLi(αmax − αmin)) ‖xki − x∗i ‖2 + 4piα2iC2
+ 2piαiL¯iNM E[‖vˆki − yk‖ | Fk]− 2piαmin(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ).
Since vˆki is a convex combination of v
k
j , j ∈ N and the norm is a convex function, we have
‖vˆki −yk‖ ≤
∑N
j=1[W (k)]ij‖vkj −yk‖. Thus, E[‖vˆki −yk‖ | Fk] ≤
∑N
j=1 E[W (k)]ij‖vkj −yk‖. By using
the preceding relation, mini pi = pmin, pmax = maxi pi, and αi ≤ αmax, we arrive at the following
relation for all i ∈ N ,
E[‖xk+1i − x∗i ‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1 + 2pmaxmaxi Li(αmax − αmin))‖x
k
i − x∗i ‖2 + 4pmaxα2maxC2
+ 2pmaxαmaxB
N∑
j=1
E[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖ − 2pminαmin(Fi(xki , x¯k)− Fi(x∗i , x¯∗))T (xki − x∗i ), (54)
with B = (maxi L¯i)NM .
Summing the relations in (54) over all i = 1, . . . , N , recalling that Fi, i = 1, . . . , N are coordinate
maps for the map F (see (7)), which in turn defines the mapping φ through (8), we further obtain
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 | Fk] ≤ (1 + 2pmaxmax
i
Li(αmax − αmin))‖xk − x∗‖2 + 4pmaxα2maxC2N
+ 2pmaxαmaxB
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖ − 2pminαmin(φ(xk)− φ(x∗))T (xk − x∗),
The matrix E[W (k)] is doubly stochastic, so we have
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖ =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
E[W (k)]ij‖vkj − yk‖ =
N∑
j=1
‖vkj − yk‖.
Using this relation and the strong monotonicity of the mapping φ with a constant µ, gathering the
common terms, and taking the total expectation, we obtain for all k ≥ 0,
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ qE[‖xk − x∗‖2] + 4pmaxα2maxC2N + 2pmaxαmaxB
N∑
j=1
E[‖vkj − yk‖], (55)
where q = 1− 2µpminαmin + 2pmaxmaxi Li(αmax − αmin). Note that by the condition
0 < 1− 2µpminαmin + 2pmaxmax
i
Li(αmax − αmin) < 1,
we have 0 < q < 1. We further have {xk} ⊆ K for a compact set K, so the limit superior of
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] exists. Thus, by taking the limit as k →∞ in relation (55) and using Lemma 11, we
obtain
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk+1 − x∗‖2] ≤ q lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] + 4pmaxα2maxC2N + 2pmaxαmaxB
√
2nN Cαmax
1−√λ ,
which implies the stated result.
We have few comments on the result of Proposition 4, as follows. The error bound depends
on the dimension n of the decision variables, the number N of players, the frequency with which
players update their decisions (captioned by pmin and pmax), and the network properties including
the connectivity time bound B and the ability to propagate the information (captured by the value
1−√λ). When the network parameters B and λ, and the players’ update probabilities (pmin and
pmax) do not depend on N , the error bound grows linearly with the number N of players.
As a special case, consider the case when the agents employ an equal stepsize, i.e., αmin =
αmax = α and α satisfies the following condition 0 < α <
1
2µpmin
. Then, the result of Proposition 4
reduces to
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
pmaxα
(
2C2N +BC
√
2nN
1−√λ
)
µpmin
.
As another special case, consider the case when all players have equal probabilities of updating,
i.e., pmin = pmax = p. Then, we have the following result:
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤
α2max
(
2C2N +BC
√
2nN
1−√λ
)
µαmin − (maxi Li)(αmax − αmin) ,
When all players have equal probabilities of updating and all use equal stepsizes, i.e., pmin = pmax =
p and αmin = αmax = α, then the condition of Proposition 4 reduces to 0 < α <
1
2µp , and the bound
further simplifies to:
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x∗‖2] ≤ α
µ
(
2C2N +BC
√
2nN
1−√λ
)
.
5 Generalizations and Extensions
In prior sections, we have developed two algorithms for addressing a class of Nash games. To recap,
our prescribed class of equilibrium computation schemes may accommodate a specific sublcass of
noncooperative N−person Nash games, qualified as aggregative. Specifically, in such games, given
x¯−i, the ith player solves the deterministic convex program given by (2). Unlike in much of prior
work, players cannot observe x¯−i but may learn it through the exchange of information with their
local neighbors based on an underlying graph. This underlying graph may either be time-varying
with a connectivity requirement or be fixed. In the case of the former, we present a synchronous
scheme that mandates that every agent synchronizes its updates and information exchanges while
in the latter case, we develop a an asynchronous gossip protocol for communication. Under a strict
monotonicity and suitably defined Lipschitzian requirements on the map F and compactness of
the set K, we show that both algorithms produce sequences that are guaranteed to converge to
the unique equilibrium in an almost sure sense. More succinctly, under appropriate communica-
tion requirements, any deterministic convex aggregative Nash game may be addressed through such
synchronous/asynchronous techniques as long as the requirements on the map and strategy sets
hold.
Naturally, one may rightly question whether the presented schemes (and their variants) can
accommodate weakening some of the assumptions, both on the map and more generally on the
model. Motivated by this concern, in Section 5.1, we begin by discussing how extensions of the
algorithm can allow for accommodating weaker assumptions on the problem setting. Subsequently,
in Section 5.2, we discuss how the very nature of the coupling across agents can also be generalized.
5.1 Weakening assumptions on problem parameters
We consider three extensions to our prescribed class of games:
Strict monotonicity: The a.s. convergence theory for both the synchronous and asynchronous
schemes rely on the strict monotonicity of the map as asserted by Assumption 2. There are several
avenues for weakening such a requirement. For instance, one approach relies on using a regularized
variant of (10), given by
xk+1i = ΠKi [x
k
i − αk(Fi(xki , Nvˆki ) + ǫk,ixki )], (56)
vk+1i = vˆ
k
i + x
k+1
i − xki , (57)
where {ǫk,i} denotes a sequence that diminishes to zero at a prescribed rate. Such an approach
has been employed in prior work and allow for the solution of both deterministic [22] and stochas-
tic [24] monotone variational inequality problems. An alternative approach may lie in the usage
of an extragradient framework that requires taking two, rather than one, gradient step. Via such
approaches, it has been shown [20] that the gap function associated with a monotone stochastic
variational inequality problem tends to zero in mean. We believe distributed counterparts of ex-
tragradient schemes hold significant and represent a generalization of the schemes presented in this
paper.
Lipschitz continuity: A second assumption employed in deriving convergence and rate statements
is the (uniform) Lipschitzian assumption as articulated in Assumption 3. We believe that there
are at least two avenues that can be adopted in weakening this requirement. First, there has
been significant recent work that integrates the use of local or randomized smoothing (also called
Steklov-Sobolev smoothing) to address stochastic variational inequalities in which the maps are
not necessarily Lipschitz continuous (cf. [63]). It may well be possible to extend such techniques to
address settings where the uniformly Lipschitzian assumption does not hold. An alternate approach
may lie in developing convergence in mean of the gap function, as adopted in [20] where the either
Lipschitz continuity or boundedness of the map is necessary.
Stochastic payoff functions: Presently, the main source of uncertainty arises either from the evolu-
tion of the connectivity graph (synchronous scheme) or the randomness in the choice of players that
communicate as per the gossip protocol (asynchronous) scheme. Yet, the player objectives could
also be expectation-valued. Consequently, the equilibrium conditions are given by a stochastic
variational inequality. In such instances, one may articulate suitably defined distributed stochastic
approximation counterparts of (10) to cope with such a challenge (cf. [24]). We believe conver-
gence analysis of such schemes, while more complicated, is likely to carry through under suitable
assumptions.
5.2 Extensions to model
It may have been observed that the proposed developments in the earlier two sections required that
the agent decisions be of the same dimension. In this subsection, we extend the realm of (2) and
generalize the algorithms presented in section 3 and section 4. To this end, consider the following
aggregative game
minimize fi
(
xi,
N∑
i=1
hi(xi)
)
subject to xi ∈ Ki, (58)
where Ki ⊆ Rni , hi : Ki → Rn. The mappings fi and hi are considered to be information private
to player i. Such an extension allows players decisions to have different dimensionality. To recover
the problem articulated by (2), we set hi(xi) = xi with Ki ⊆ Rn for all i. Next, we discuss the
generalization of the proposed distributed algorithms to solve problem (58).
Synchronous Algorithm: To make the synchronous algorithm suitable for the generalized problem
in (58), the mixing step in (9) remains the same, but with a different initial condition. Namely, the
mixing in (9) is initiated with
v0i = hi(x
0
i ) for all i = 1, . . . , N, (59)
where x0i ∈ Ki are initial players’ decisions. The iterate update of (10) and update of the average
estimate (57) are modified, leading to the following:
xk+1i = ΠKi [x
k
i − αkFi(xki , Nvˆki )], (60)
vk+1i = vˆ
k
i + hi(x
k+1
i )− hi(xki ), (61)
where αk is the stepsize, the mapping Fi is given by
Fi
(
xi,
N∑
i=1
hi(xi)
)
= ∇xifi
(
xi,
N∑
i=1
hi(xi)
)
, (62)
and Nvˆki in (60) is an estimate of the true value
∑N
i=1 hi(xi). In the context of the extended
synchronous algorithm in the preceding discussion, we have the following result.
Proposition 5. Let Assumptions 1–6 hold for the mapping φ(x) = (φ1(x), . . . , φN (x))
T with coor-
dinates φi(x) = ∇xifi
(
xi,
∑N
i=1 hi(xi)
)
and x = (xT1 , . . . , x
T
N )
T . Then, the sequence {xk} generated
by the method (60)–(61) converges to the (unique) solution x∗ of the game in (58).
Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Proposition 2.
Asynchronous Algorithm: We now discuss how the gossip algorithm in section 4 may be modified.
While the estimate mixing in (23) remains unchanged, the initial condition is replaced by one given
in (59). The iterate update of (28) and average estimate update of (29) are modified, as follows:
xk+1i := (ΠKi [x
k
i − αk,iFi(xki , Nvˆki )]− xki )1{i∈{Ik ,Jk}} + xki , (63)
vk+1i := vˆ
k
i + hi(x
k+1
i )− hi(xki ), (64)
where αk,i is the stepsize for user i and the mapping Fi is as defined in (62). The following result
establishes the convergence of the extended asynchronous algorithm.
Proposition 6. Let Assumptions 1–3 and Assumption 7 hold. Then, the sequence {xk} generated
by the method (63)–(64) with stepsize αk,i =
1
Γk(i)
converges to the (unique) x∗ of the game almost
surely.
Proof. With the initial condition specified by (59), the proof follows in a fashion similar to that of
Proposition 3.
6 Numerics
In this section, we examine the performance of the proposed algorithms on a class of Nash-Cournot
games. Such games represent an instance of aggregative Nash games and in section 6.1, we describe
the player payoffs and strategy sets as well as verify that they satisfy the necessary assumptions.
In section 6.2, we discuss the synchronous setting and present the results arising from applying our
algorithms. In section 6.3, we turn our attention to asynchronous regime where we present our
numerical experience of applying the gossip algorithm.
6.1 Nash-Cournot Game
We consider a networked Nash-Cournot games which is possibly amongst the best known examples
of an aggregative game. Specifically, the aggregate in such games is the total sales which is the
sum of production over all the players. The market price is set in accord with an inverse demand
function which depends on the aggregate of the network. A formal description of such a game over
a network is provided in Example 1. Before proceeding to describe our experimental setup, we show
that Nash-Cournot games do indeed satisfy Assumptions 3 and 8, respectively, under some mild
conditions on the cost and price functions. It is worth pointing that we have used Assumption 8
only for the error bound results for the asynchronous algorithm with a constant stepsize.
In the sequel, within the context of Example 1, we let xil = (gil, sil) for all l = 1, . . . ,L,
xi = (xi1, . . . , xiL) and x = (x1, . . . , xN )T . Further, we define coordinate maps Fi(xi, u), as follows:
Fi(xi, u) =

 Fi1(xi1, u1)...
FiL(xiL, uL)

 , Fil(xil, ul) = ( c′il(gil)−pl(ul)− p′l(ul)sil
)
, (65)
where the prime denotes the first derivative. We let F (x, u) = (F1(x1, u)
T , . . . , FN (xN , u)
T )T , and
Ki denote the constraint set on player i decision, xi, as given in Example 1.
We note that the Nash-Cournot game under the consideration satisfies Assumption 1 as long
as the cost functions cil are convex and the price functions pl(ul) are concave for all i and l.
Furthermore, the strict convexity condition of Assumption 2 is satisfied when, for example, all
price functions pl are strictly concave. This can be seen by observing that
(F (x, u) − F (x˜, u))T (x− x˜) =
L∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
(c′il(gil)− c′il(g˜il))(gil − g˜il)−
L∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
p′l(ul)(sil − s˜il)2.
Next, we show that the Lipschitzian requirements on the maps Fi of Assumption 3 holds under
some mild assumptions on the cost and price functions in Nash-Cournot games, as shown next.
Lemma 12. Consider the Nash-Cournot game described in Example 1. Suppose that each pl(ul) is
concave and has Lipschitz continuous derivatives with a constant Ml (over a coordinate projection
of K¯ on the lth coordinate axis). Then, the following relation holds:
‖Fi(xi, u)− Fi(xi, z)‖ ≤
√
2
√√√√ L∑
l=1
(C2l +M
2
l cap
2
il) ‖u− z‖ for all u, z ∈ K¯.
Proof. This result follows directly from the definition of the coordinate maps Fil(xil, u) and recalling
that xil = (gil, sil). In particular, for each i, ℓ we have
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(xil, zl)‖ =
√
|c′il(gil)− c′il(gil)|2 + |pl(ul) + p′l(ul)sil − pl(zl)− p′l(zl)sil|2
=
√
|(pl(ul)− pl(zl)) + (p′l(ul)− p′l(zl))sil|2
≤
√
2
√
|pl(ul)− pl(zl)|2 + |p′l(ul)− p′l(zl)|2s2il,
where the inequality follows from (a + b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2). Since K¯ is compact and each pl has
continuous derivatives, it follows that there exists a constant Cl for every l such that
|p′l(ul)| ≤ Cl for all ul with u = (u1, . . . , uL)T ∈ K¯.
Then, by using concavity of pl, we can see that |pl(ul)− pl(zl)| ≤ Cl|ul − zl| implying that
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(xil, zl)‖ ≤
√
2
√
C2l |ul − zl|2 + |p′l(ul)− p′l(zl)|2s2il
≤
√
2
√
(C2l +M
2
l s
2
il)|ul − zl|,
where the last inequality is obtained by using the Lipschitz property of the derivative p′l(ul). From
the structure of constraints we have sil ≤ capil yielding
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(xil, zl)‖ ≤
√
2
√
C2l +M
2
l cap
2
il |ul − zl| for all l.
Further, by using Ho¨lder’s inequality, and recalling that xi = (xi1, . . . , xiL) and u = (u1, . . . , uL),
from the preceding relation we obtain
‖Fi(xi, u)− Fi(xi, z)‖ =
√√√√ L∑
l=1
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(xil, zl)‖2 ≤
√
2
√√√√ L∑
l=1
(C2l +M
2
l cap
2
il) ‖u− z‖.
We now show that Fi(x, u) is Lipschitz continuous in x for every u.
Lemma 13. Consider the Nash-Cournot game described in Example 1. Suppose that each c′il is
Lipschitz continuous with a constant Lil and |p′l(u)| ≤ p¯l for some scalar p¯l and for all u ∈ K¯.
Then, the following relation holds for all i,
‖Fi(xi, u)− Fi(x˜i, u)‖ ≤
√√√√ L∑
l=1
(
L2il + p¯
2
l
) ‖xi − x˜i‖ for all xi, x˜i ∈ Ki.
Proof. First, we note that for each i, l,
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(x˜il, ul)‖ =
√
|c′il(gil)− c′il(g˜il)|2 + |p′l(ul)(sil − s˜il)|2
≤
√
L2il|gil − g˜il|2 + p¯2l |sil − s˜il|2.
Recalling our notation xil = (gil, sil) and x˜il = (g˜il, s˜il), and using Ho¨lder’s inequality, we find that
‖Fil(xil, ul)− Fil(x˜il, ul)‖ ≤
√
L2il + p¯
2
l ‖xil − x˜il‖.
Further, recalling that xi = (xi1, . . . , xiL), x˜i = (x˜i1, . . . , x˜iL), and u = (u1, . . . , uL), the desired
result follows from the preceding relation by using Ho¨lders inequality.
In our numerical study, we consider a Nash-Cournot game played over ten locations, i.e. L = 10,
in which all players have cost functions of a similar structure and the ith player’s optimization
problem may be expressed as
minimize
10∑
l=1
(cil(gil)− pl(s¯l)sil)
subject to
10∑
l=1
gil =
10∑
l=1
sil,
gil, sil ≥ 0, gil ≤ capil, l = 1, . . . , 10, (66)
where gil and sil denote player i’s production and sales at location l, respectively, and s¯l denotes
the aggregate of all the players’ decisions (s¯l =
∑N
i=1 sil) at location l. The function cil(gil) denotes
the cost of production for ith player at location l and has the following form:
cil(gil) = ailgil + bilg
2
il,
where ail and bil are scaling parameters for agent i. In our experiments, we draw ail and bil from
a uniform distribution and fix them over the course of the entire simulation. More precisely, for
i = 1, . . . , N, and l = 1, . . . , 10, we have ail ∼ U(2, 12) and bil ∼ U(2, 3), where U(t, τ) denotes the
uniform distribution over an interval [t, τ ] with t < τ. The term pl(s¯l) captures the inverse demand
function and takes the following form:
pl(s¯l) = dl − s¯l,
where dl is a parameter for location l. The parameters dl are also drawn randomly with a uniform
distribution, dl ∼ U(90, 100) for all l = 1, . . . , 10. Furthermore, we use capil = 500 for all i =
1, . . . , N and for all l = 1, . . . , 10. The affine price function gives rise to a strongly monotone
map φ = F (x, x¯), which together with the compactness of the sets Ki, implies that this game has a
unique Nash equilibrium. Note that in our setup, we have capil > dl indicating that at a particular
location, a player may produce more than the overall demand at that particular location. Such a
scenario can arise when it might be more efficient to produce at a location to meet the demand(s)
of another location(s) assuming the transportation costs are zero.
6.2 Synchronous Algorithm
In this section, we investigate the performance of synchronous algorithm of section 3 for the com-
putation of the equilibrium of aggregative game (66). We begin by describing our setting for the
connectivity graph of the network of players, where each player is seen as a node in a graph. At
each iteration k, we generate a symmetric N × N adjacency matrix A such that the underlying
graph is connected. The entries of A are generated by performing the following steps:
(0) Let I denote the set of nodes that have already been generated;
(1) For each newly generated node j, select a node randomly i ∈ I to establish an edge {i, j} and
set [A]ij = [A]ji = 1;
(2) Repeat step 1 until I = {1, . . . , N}.
Given such an adjacency matrix A, we define a doubly stochastic symmetric weight matrix W
such that
[W ]ij =


0 if Aij = 0
δ if Aij = 1 and i 6= j
1− δd(i) if i = j,
where d(i) represents the number of players communicating with player i, and
δ =
0.5
maxi{d(i)} .
Using the adjacency matrix A and the weight matrix W , players update their decision and their
estimate of the average using (9)–(11). The stepsize rule for agent update is as follows:
αk,i =
1
k
for all i = 1, . . . , N.
The algorithm is initiated at a random starting point, and terminated after a fixed number of
iterations, denoted by k˜, for each sample path. We use a set of 50 sample paths for each simulation
setting, and we report the empirical mean of the sample errors, defined as:
errork˜ =
max
i∈{1,...,N}
max
l∈{1,...,10}
{
|gk˜il − g∗il|, |sk˜il − s∗il|
}
max
i∈{1,...,N}
max
l∈{1,...,10}
{|g∗il|, |s∗il|}
, (67)
where g∗il and s
∗
il are the decisions of agent i at the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium decisions
g∗il and s
∗
il are computed using a constant steplength gradient projection algorithm assuming each
agent has true information of the aggregate. Note that such an algorithm is guaranteed to converge
under the strict convexity of the players’ costs.
We investigate cases with 20 and 50 players in the network. In Table 1 and Table 2, we report
the empirical mean of the error and 90% confidence interval attained for different levels of k˜, (the
simulation length), respectively. Some insights that can be drawn from the simulations are provided
next:
• Expectedly, as seen in Table 1 and Table 2, the empirical mean of the error upon termination
and the width of the confidence interval decrease with increasing k˜ and increase with network
size.
• The impact of the time-varying nature of the connectivity graph is explored by considering a
static complete graph as a basis for comparison. In Table 3 and Table 4, we report the mean
error and the confidence interval when the network is static. Under this setting, the agents
have access to the true aggregate information throughout the run of the algorithm. Naturally,
the performance of the algorithm on a static complete network is orders of magnitude better
than that on a dynamic network. This deterioration in performance may be interpreted as
the price of information from the standpoint of convergence.
Table 1: Dynamic network: Mean error on ter-
mination vs network size for various thresholds
N k˜ = 5e3 k˜ = 1e4
20 9.22e-5 3.66e-5
50 8.38e-2 2.65e-3
Table 2: Dynamic network: Width of 90% con-
fidence interval of mean error
N k˜ = 5e3 k˜ = 1e4
20 2.147e-4 9.33e-5
50 1.24e-1 2.78e-2
Table 3: Static network: Mean error on termi-
nation
N k˜ = 5e3 k˜ = 1e4
20 3.66e-5 3.66e-5
50 6.23e-5 6.23e-5
Table 4: Static network: Width of 90% confi-
dence interval of mean error
N k˜ = 5e3 k˜ = 1e4
20 6.99e-9 6.99e-9
50 1.61e-8 1.61e-8
6.3 Asynchronous Algorithm
We now demonstrate the performance of the asynchronous algorithm of section 4. We consider four
instances of connectivity graphs which we describe next and, also, depict these graphs in Figure 45.
• Cycle: Every player has two neighbors;
• Wheel: There is one central player that is connected to every other player;
• Grid: Players on the vertex have two neighbors, players on the edge have three and everyone
else has four neighbors. Each row in the grid consists of five players and there are N/5 rows
where N is the size of the network;
• Complete graph: Every player has an edge connecting it to every other player.
Note that, in each connectivity graph, players can only communicate with their immediate neigh-
bors.
5The network topology shown in Figure 4 is for demo purposes only. For instance, Figure 4(a) is an example of a
cycle network with 5 players.
(a) Cycle (b) Wheel (c) Grid (d) Complete graph
Figure 4: A depiction of communication networks used in simulations.
For every type of connectivity graph, we initiate the algorithm from a random starting point
and terminate it after k˜ iterations. A 95% confidence interval of the mean sample error at the
termination is computed for a sample of size 50, where the sample-path error is defined as in (67).
The players’ stepsize rules that we use are:
αk,i =
{ 9
Γk(i)
for a diminishing stepsize
αi for a constant stepsize,
where αi is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, αi ∼ U(5e-3, 1e-2). We again investigate
cases when there are 20 and 50 players in the network and derive the following insights:
• In Tables 5–6, we report the mean error and in Tables 7–8, we report the width of the
confidence interval for various levels of k˜. The results are consistent with our theoretical
findings, and they indicate a decrease in the mean error and the width of the confidence
interval with increasing k˜. As expected, the mean error at the termination increases with
the size of the network. It is worth mentioning the discrepancy in the value of k˜ across
synchronous and asynchronous algorithm. Note that in the asynchronous algorithm, only
two agents are performing updates and thus, for a network of size N, k˜ global iterations
translates to 2k˜/N iterations per agent, approximately.
• On comparing the performance of the synchronous algorithm (cf. Tables 1–4) to that of the
asynchronous algorithm (cf. Tables 5–8), we observe that the synchronous algorithm performs
better than its asynchronous counterpart in terms of mean error and the confidence width at
termination. This is expected as in the synchronous setting, the players’ communicate more
frequently and the network diffuses information faster than in the asynchronous setting.
• The nature of the connectivity graph plays an important role in the performance of the
synchronous algorithm. However, such an influence in the asynchronous setting is less pro-
nounced.
• In an effort to better understand the impact of connectivity, in Table 9, we compare the
number of iterations6 required for the player’s to concur on the aggregate g¯∗ within a threshold
of 1e-3 when the network consists of N = 20 players. We also present a metric of connectivity
density given by pmin/pmax as well as the square root of the second largest eigenvalue of
the expected weight matrix, i.e.,
√
λ, which in effect determines the rate of information
dissemination in the network. We note that the number of iterations needed to achieve
6The iteration number is the mean for 50 sample rounded to the smallest integer over-estimate.
the threshold error correlates with the value of
√
λ and this prompts us to arrive at the
following conclusion: Having a well-informed up-to-date neighbor is more important than
having a denser connectivity. For instance, a wheel network has a poor connectivity of all
the network type based on the pmin/pmax criterion yet it has superior aggregate convergence
to all but the complete network. In part, this is because the central agent in such a network
updates throughout the course of the algorithm, allowing for good mixing of network wide
information. In contrast, the cycle network though better connected yet cannot ensure good
mixing of information, given that no agent has access to “good information.” Similarly, a
complete network provides each agent with an opportunity to communicate with every other
agent and thus ensures good mixing of information. The grid network falls between the
wheel and the cycle network in terms of availability of well-informed neighbors and thus the
performance.
Table 5: Mean error after k˜ = 5e4 iterations for gossip algorithm
Constant Step Diminishing Step
N Cycle Wheel Grid Complete Cycle Wheel Grid Complete
20 2.29e-3 3.66e-5 3.66e-5 3.66e-5 2.51e-2 1.01e-4 1.93e-3 4.64e-5
50 2.80e-1 6.76e-2 1.76e-1 1.26e-3 1.22 2.33e-2 8.41e-1 3.68e-3
Table 6: Mean error after k˜ = 1e5 iterations for gossip algorithm
Constant Step Diminishing Step
N Cycle Wheel Grid Complete Cycle Wheel Grid Complete
20 3.78e-5 3.66e-5 3.66e-5 3.66e-5 3.93e-3 3.65e-5 1.69e-4 3.67e-5
50 1.65e-1 1.09e-3 9.19e-2 6.23e-5 7.63e-1 1.99e-3 4.57e-1 2.83e-4
Table 7: Width of 90% confidence interval after k˜ = 5e4 iterations for gossip algorithm
Constant Step Diminishing Step
N Cycle Wheel Grid Complete Cycle Wheel Grid Complete
20 1.87e-4 8.22e-7 5.34e-7 0e0 7.51e-2 4.76e-3 2.08e-2 3.23e-3
50 1.68e-2 6.33e-3 1.89e-2 1.77e-4 5.23e-1 7.23e-2 4.35e-1 2.87e-2
Table 8: Width of 90% confidence interval after k˜ = 1e5 iterations for gossip algorithm
Constant Step Diminishing Step
N Cycle Wheel Grid Complete Cycle Wheel Grid Complete
20 2.4e-6 4.74e-10 4.74e-10 4.74e-10 4.40e-4 7.23e-7 2.07e-5 1.56e-7
50 1.35e-2 1.33e-4 1.40e-2 1.78e-8 6.91e-2 1.81e-4 4.15e-2 2.22e-5
Table 9: Number of iteration for concurrence of player’s aggregate within an error of 1e-3
Network pmin/pmax λ Iterations
Cycle 1 0.9994 48818
Wheel 1/19 0.1622 8324
Grid 5/7 0.3151 17950
Complete 1 1.0888e-08 5842
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper focuses on a class of Nash games in which player interactions are seen through the
aggregate sum of all players’ actions. The players and their interactions are modeled as a network
with limited connectivity which only allows for restricted local communication. We propose two
types of algorithms, namely, a synchronous (consensus-based) and an asynchronous (gossip-based)
distributed algorithm, both of which abide by an information exchange restriction for computa-
tion of an equilibrium point. Our synchronous algorithm allows for implementation in a dynamic
network with a time-varying connectivity graph. In contrast, our asynchronous algorithm allows
for an implementation in a static network. We establish error bounds on the deviation of players’s
decision from the equilibrium decision when a constant, yet player specific, stepsize is employed in
the asynchronous algorithm. Our extensions allow the players’ decisions to be coupled in a more
general form of “aggregates”. The contribution of our work can broadly be summarized as: (1)
the development of synchronous and asynchronous distributed algorithms for aggregative games
over graphs; (2) the establishment of the convergence of the algorithms to an equilibrium point,
including the case with player specific stepsizes; and (3) an extension to a more general classes
of aggregative games. We also provide illustrative numerical results that support our theoretical
findings.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7:
Proof. Note that Γk,i =
∑k
t=1 1Si,t where Si,t is the event that agent i updates at time t and 1S is
the indicator function of an event S. Since the events Si,t, t = 1, 2, . . . , are i.i.d. with mean pi for
each i ∈ N , by the law of iterated logarithms (cf. [10], pages 476–479), we have for any q > 0, with
probability 1,
lim
k→∞
|Γk(i)− kpi|
k
1
2
+q
= 0 for all i ∈ N .
Thus, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a sufficiently large k˜(ω) (depending on q and N ), such
that |Γk(i)− kpi|
k
1
2
+q
≤ 1
N2
for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N . (68)
This implies that for almost every ω ∈ Ω and for all i ∈ N and k ≥ k˜(ω),
Γk(i) ≥ kpi − 1
N2
k
1
2
+q =
(
pik
1
2
−q − 1
N2
)
k
1
2
+q. (69)
Now, let q ∈ (0, 1/2), implying that the term k 12−qpi tends to infinity as k tends to infinity. Thus,
we can choose a larger k˜(ω) (if needed) so that with probability 1, we have
pik
1
2
−q − 1
N2
≥ 1
2
pik
1
2
−q for all k ≥ k˜ and i ∈ N , (70)
or equivalently
P
[
ω : pik
1
2
−q − 1
N2
≥ 1
2
pik
1
2
−q for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N
]
= 1.
From (69) and (70), we obtain that for almost every ω ∈ Ω, Γk(i) ≥ 12kpi for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and all
i ∈ N , implying that
P
[
ω :
1
Γk(i)
≤ 2
kpi
for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N
]
= 1, (71)
thus showing the first relation of the lemma holds in view of αk,i =
1
Γk(i)
.
We now consider
∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi ∣∣∣ . For almost every ω ∈ Ω, we have for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N ,∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ = 1kpi 1Γk(i) |kpi − Γk(i)| ≤ 2k2p2i |kpi − Γk(i)|,
where the inequality follows by (71). By using relation (68), it follows that for almost every ω ∈ Ω
and for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and i ∈ N ,∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2k2p2i
k
1
2
+q
N2
=
2
k
3
2
−qp2iN2
.
Since agent i updates with probability pi =
1
N (1 +
∑
j∈Ni pij), it follows that
pi ≥ 1
N
(
1 +
(
min
{i,j}∈E
pij
)
|Ni|
)
≥ 1
N
(
1 + min
{i,j}∈E
pij
)
, (72)
where the last inequality follows from |Ni| ≥ 1 (since the graph (N , E) has no isolated node).
Hence, for almost every ω ∈ Ω and for all k ≥ k˜(ω) and all i,∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2N2
k
3
2
−q (1 + min{i,j}∈E pij)2N2 =
2
k
3
2
−q (1 + min{i,j}∈E pij)2 .
The desired relation follows by letting pˆ = 1 +min{i,j}∈E pij:
P
[
ω :
∣∣∣∣αk,i − 1kpi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2
k
3
2
−q (1 + min{i,j}∈E pij)2 for k ≥ k˜(ω)
]
= 1.
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